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Abstract	When	discussing	scientific	objectivity,	many	philosophers	of	science	have	recently	focused	on	accounts	that	can	be	applied	in	practice	when	assessing	the	objectivity	of	something.	It	has	become	clear	that	in	different	contexts,	objectivity	is	realized	in	different	ways,	and	the	many	senses	of	objectivity	recognized	in	the	recent	literature	seem	to	be	conceptually	distinct.	I	argue	that	these	diverse	'applicable'	senses	of	scientific	objectivity	have	more	in	common	than	has	thus	far	been	recognized.	I	combine	arguments	from	philosophical	discussions	of	trust,	from	negative	accounts	of	objectivity,	and	from	the	recent	literature	on	epistemic	risks.	When	we	call	X	objective,	we	endorse	it:	we	say	that	we	rely	on	X,	and	that	others	should	do	so	too.	But	the	word	'objective'	is	reserved	for	a	specific	type	of	reliance:	it	is	based	on	the	belief	that	important	epistemic	risks	arising	from	our	imperfections	as	epistemic	agents	have	been	effectively	averted.	All	the	positive	senses	of	objectivity	identify	either	some	risk	of	this	type,	or	some	efficient	strategy	for	averting	one	or	more	such	risks.		
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1.	Introduction	In	this	article	I	defend	a	risk	account	of	scientific	objectivity.	The	account	is	meant	to	be	a	largely	descriptive	or	even	a	semantic	one;	my	aim	is	to	draw	together	ideas	presented	in	recent	discussions,	and	to	clarify	what	we	philosophers	of	science	do	when	we	identify	distinct,	applicable	senses	of	objectivity	or	call	something	objective.	However,	the	article	also	has	a	prescriptive	side	to	it.	I	believe	objectivity	to	be	a	useful	notion	for	philosophy	of	science,	and	I	will	argue	that	the	risk	account	shows	why	and	how	this	is	the	case.	When	discussing	scientific	objectivity,	many	philosophers	of	science	have	recently	focused	on	accounts	that	could	be	used	in	practice	when	assessing	the	objectivity	of	something.	Particularly	the	critique	of	one	influential	account,	the	value-free	ideal,	has	led	to	the	recognition	of	several	other	senses	of	scientific	objectivity	(see	e.g.	Longino	[1990],	[2001];	Janack	[2002];	Douglas	[2004];	Tsou,	Richardson	and	Padovani	[2015];	Axtell	[2016]).	For	instance,	we	may	call	a	result	objective	when	a	research	community	agrees	on	it;	or	we	may	call	a	method	objective	when	it	produces	the	same	results	regardless	of	who	uses	it.	As	Heather	Douglas	([2004];	[2009])	has	noted,	if	one	wants	to	avoid	certain	strong	metaphysical	or	epistemological	commitments,	the	recognized	senses	seem	to	be	conceptually	distinct.	However,	all	these	senses	of	objectivity	have	normative	force;	they	are	not	just	descriptions	of	ways	in	which	people	use	the	words	'objectivity'	and	'objective',	but	identify	instances	where	we	seem	to	be	justified	in	calling	something	objective.	My	aim	is	to	show	that	the	diverse	'applicable'	senses	of	objectivity	recognized	in	the	recent	literature	do	in	fact	have	more	in	common	than	has	as	yet	been	recognized.	I	propose	an	account	that	brings	some	unity	to	the	discussion:	it	covers	all	these	senses	of	objectivity,	and	clarifies	why	they	have	normative	force.	I	argue	that	when	we	call	X	objective,	we	endorse	it:	we	say	that	we	rely	on	X,	and	that	others	should	do	so	too.	But	the	word	'objective'	is	reserved	for	a	specific	type	of	reliance:	it	is	based	on	the	belief	that	important	epistemic	risks	arising	from	our	imperfections	as	epistemic	agents	have	been	effectively	averted.	I	will	start	by	discussing	the	diverse	applicable	and	often	contextual	senses	of	scientific	objectivity	recognized	in	the	recent	literature.	I	then	proceed	to	examine	a	suggestion	made	by	Arthur	Fine	([1998]),	and	Heather	Douglas	([2004],	[2009])	among	others,	namely	that	all	the	different	senses	of	objectivity	indicate	a	shared	basis	for	trust.	This	idea	is	based	on	an	important	intuition,	but	it	needs	to	be	refined.	If	we	distinguish	between	trust	and	reliance	by	saying	that	trust	can	be	betrayed	or	let	down,	whereas	reliance	can	only	be	disappointed	(Baier	[1986];	see	also	Hardwig	[1991]),	it	becomes	clear	that	when	trying	to	identify	what	the	different	senses	of	objectivity	have	in	common,	we	should	talk	about	reliance	instead	of	trust.	I	then	examine	negative	accounts	of	objectivity,	in	which	objectivity	is	taken	to	mark	the	absence	of	something—notably	some	form	of	subjectivity	(Daston	and	Galison	[2007]).	By	combining	such	negative	accounts	with	the	idea	of	epistemic	risks	(Biddle	and	Kukla	
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[2017];	Biddle	[forthcoming]),	I	argue	that	the	different	positive	senses	of	objectivity	identify	either	an	epistemic	risk	arising	from	our	imperfections	as	epistemic	agents,	or	some	efficient	strategy	for	averting	one	or	several	such	risks.	I	then	proceed	to	defend	the	risk	account	of	scientific	objectivity.	I	argue	that	it	clarifies	why	the	different,	applicable	senses	of	objectivity	are	often	related	to	some	specific	context,	and	helps	us	to	analyse	what	happens	when	people	disagree	about	the	objectivity	of	something.	Before	concluding,	I	present	two	examples	of	contexts	where	the	account	can	be	fruitful:	it	helps	us	to	re-examine	the	question	of	objectivity	in	humanities	research	and	in	the	social	sciences,	and	it	helps	us	to	distinguish	between	two	basic	ways	in	which	the	democratisation	of	scientific	knowledge	production	may	threaten	its	objectivity.		
2.	Applicable	Notions	of	Objectivity	The	ideal	of	objectivity	is	often	considered	to	be	a	cornerstone	of	scientific	inquiry,	one	on	which	the	epistemic	authority	of	science	rests.	At	the	same	time,	it	appears	to	many	as	an	unattainable	goal.	The	modern	notion	of	objectivity	has	ofen	been	taken	to	contain	the	idea	that	objective	knowledge	is	knowledge	about	the	object,	untainted	by	distortions	caused	by	our	subjectivity.	In	other	words,	an	objective	scientific	claim	or	theory	would	tell	us	correctly	about	the	objects	in	the	world—it	would	be	'faithful	to	facts'	(Reiss	and	Sprenger	[2016]).	For	many	reasons,	philosophers	have	doubted	the	possibility	of	us	securing	such	knowledge.	For	instance,	one	can	follow	Duhem	and	Quine	and	emphasize	the	empirical	underdetermination	of	scientific	theories—or	choose	a	Nietzschean	or	Foucauldian	approach	and	stress	how	the	indissoluble	links	between	knowledge	and	power	taint	science.	Despite	such	fundamental	doubts,	the	notions	of	objectivity	and	objective	knowledge	have	persisted.	They	are	central	in	many	important	debates	not	only	in	the	philosophy	of	science,	but	also	in	epistemology,	metaphysics,	and	even	ethics.		In	line	with	the	ideas	embedded	in	the	modern	notion,	objectivity	has	often	been	taken	to	have	both	an	ontological	and	an	epistemological	aspect:	an	objective	knowledge	claim	would	tell	about	the	objective	world	existing	independently	of	human	observers;	the	reality	behind	the	phenomena	we	perceive	(Fine	[1998];	Reiss	[2014];	Axtell	[2016]).	This	duality	is	visible	in	the	continental	tradition,	where	discussions	of	objectivity	in	science	have	often	focused	on	the	ways	in	which	we	construct	our	objects	of	study	(see	e.g.	Megill	[1994]).	And	it	is	clear	in	the	analytical	tradition,	where	some	pronounced	realists	have	claimed	that	the	ontological	aspect	of	objectivity	is	needed	for	the	epistemic	one	to	make	sense	(Nagel	[1998]).	The	conclusion	remains	the	same:	we	can	never	be	certain	that	our	results	really	capture	what	we	hope	they	would.	We	seem	to	have	no	certain	access	to	the	'Really	Real',	as	Elizabeth	Lloyd	([1995])	has	termed	this	elusive	goal.	In	fact,	objectivity	has	for	a	long	time	been	an	issue	because	we	cannot	be	sure	that	our	claims	and	theories	are	objective	in	this	sense.	
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In	contemporary	philosophy	of	science,	objectivity	is	the	subject	of	a	lively	discussion	that	has	little	to	do	with	the	fundamental	doubts	described	above.	The	ontological	question	has	been	mostly	set	aside.	Instead,	the	focus	is	on	developing	a	less	ambitious,	but	more	usable	and	sustainable	account	of	objectivity	as	an	epistemically	normative	notion—or	several	such	accounts,	if	necessary	(Douglas	[2004];	Tsou,	Richardson	and	Padovani	[2015];	Axtell	[2016]).	What	is	wanted	is	an	account	that	we	can	actually	apply	when	trying	to	determine	the	objectivity	of	something.	Such	an	account	has	quite	a	different	set	of	desiderata	than	the	ideal	notion	that	also	encompasses	the	ontological	aspect.	An	applicable	notion	of	scientific	objectivity	should	not	imply	that	the	results	of	objective	research	would	be	certain,	as	we	need	an	account	that	allows	us	to	be	fallible.	Otherwise	it	would	not	be	usable.	Such	an	account	should	not	claim	that	we	can	have	objective	knowledge	only	of	objects	that	exist	independently	of	human	beings—we	must	be	able	to	assess	the	objectivity	of	knowledge	claims	made	about	constructed	phenomena	dependent	on	human	conceptualisations.	Moreover,	such	an	account	should	not	represent	objectivity	as	an	on–off	feature—objectivity	has	to	be	a	degree	concept.	We	must	be	able	to	say	that	something	is	more	objective	than	something	else	without	claiming	either	to	be	perfectly	objective,	and	we	need	to	be	able	to	say	that	doing	something	increases	or	decreases	the	objectivity	of	our	work.	As	many	philosophers	of	science	have	tried	to	develop	such	accounts,	they	have	come	up	with	several	different	situations	in	which—so	they	claim—we	are	justified	in	calling	something	objective.	I	am	attempting	to	develop	an	account	that	accounts	for	them	all.	The	recent	discussions	of	objectivity	have	often	been	based	on	critiques	of	an	influential	account	of	objectivity:	the	value-free	ideal.	According	to	this	ideal,	non-epistemic	values	must	not	influence	the	gathering	of	evidence	or	the	acceptance	of	scientific	theories.	The	account	seems	to	be	practicable;	it	has	often	been	used	when	assessing	the	objectivity	of	research.	However,	as	noted,	it	has	been	heavily	criticized.	Feminist	philosophers	of	science	have	long	argued	that	non-epistemic	value	judgements	can	be	necessary	in	scientific	reasoning	(e.g.	Keller	[1985];	Harding	[1986];	Haraway	[1988]).	As	Helen	Longino	([1990],	[2001])	has	stressed,	we	cannot	ensure	that	the	background	assumptions	we	base	our	research	on	are	value-free,	and	research	without	background	assumptions	is	impossible.	So	the	value-free	ideal	is	unattainable.	And	to	avoid	a	situation	where	a	whole	community	of	researchers	takes	a	certain	set	of	values	so	much	for	granted	that	they	do	not	realize	how	it	distorts	their	results,	research	communities	should	foster	diverse	values	(Haraway	[1989];	Longino	[1990],	[2001]).	Longino	([1996])	and	Phyllis	Rooney	([1992]),	among	others,	have	also	questioned	the	distinction	between	epistemic	and	non-epistemic	values.	According	to	them,	it	is	not	as	clear	as	we	would	like	to	think,	and	neither	is	the	value-free	ideal.	Moreover,	using	value-laden	concepts	may	be	unavoidable	in	many	fields	of	study	(e.g.	Dupré	[2007]).	In	recent	discussions,	it	is	particularly	the	argument	from	inductive	risk	that	has	convinced	many	philosophers	of	science	that	non-epistemic	values	have	an	important,	legitimate	role	to	play	at	all	stages	of	scientific	research.	Inductive	risk	is	the	risk	of	wrongly	accepting	or	rejecting	a	hypothesis:	it	is	a	risk	a	researcher	takes	when	
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deciding	to	make	the	inductive	leap	from	evidence	to	either	accepting	or	rejecting	a	hypothesis.	As	many	philosophers	of	science	have	argued,	non-epistemic	values	must	often	influence	such	decisions,	as	the	consequences	of	being	wrong	must	be	weighed	when	determining	whether	the	evidence	is	strong	enough	or	not.	(Rudner	[1953];	Hempel	[1965];	Douglas	[2000],	[2009].)		Most	of	what	has	been	said	recently	about	objectivity	in	philosophy	of	science	is	related	to	the	discussion	of	values	in	science.	What	is	particularly	noteworthy	here	is	that	it	has	lead	philosophers	of	science	to	recognize	many	distinct,	applicable	senses	of	objectivity	that	do	not	rest	on	the	value-free	ideal.	When	we	call	X	objective,	X	can	be,	for	instance,	a	researcher,	research	process,	knowledge	claim,	or	research	community.	And	the	ways	in	which	researchers	attempt	to	ensure	the	objectivity	of	some	X	differ	vastly	depending	on	the	field	or	discipline	in	question.	Also,	we	philosophers	of	science	use	the	adjective	'objective'	in	many	different	ways,	which	often	tend	to	be	tied	to	some	specific	context.	Marianne	Janack	([2002])	has	recognized	thirteen	conceptually	distinct	senses	of	objectivity	used	in	contemporary	philosophy	of	science,	and	Douglas	([2004],	[2009])	distinguishes	between	at	least	eight	senses	of	process	objectivity	alone.	She	divides	these	senses	into	three	modes:	in	the	first	one	the	focus	is	on	the	researchers'	interactions	with	the	world,	in	the	second	on	their	individual	thought	processes,	and	in	the	third	on	social	processes.	Most	of	the	senses	recognized	by	Janack	and	all	of	the	ones	recognized	by	Douglas	are	applicable:	they	can	be	used	when	assessing	the	objectivity	of	some	X	in	some	context.	For	instance,	in	convergent	objectivity	we	call	objective	a	result	we	can	reach	through	many	independent	avenues.	In	procedural	objectivity	the	research	process	has	been	so	designed	that	a	researcher	can	always	be	replaced	by	another,	and	that	will	not	change	the	result.	And	in	interactive	objectivity	a	research	community	follows	practices	that	ensure	effective	critical	discussions	and	debates	(Douglas	[2004],	[2009]).	This	leads	us	to	the	problem	to	which	I	am	attempting	to	offer	a	solution.	The	different	applicable	senses	or	notions	of	objectivity	seem	to	be	conceptually	distinct	(Douglas	[2004];	Daston	and	Galison	[2007];	Tsou,	Richardson	and	Padovani	[2015];	Axtell	[2016]).	They	can	complement	each	other,	but	they	can	also	be	set	against	each	other:	two	people	disagreeing	about	the	objectivity	of	some	X	often	refer	to	different	senses	of	objectivity.	According	to	Douglas	([2004];	[2009]),	the	notion	of	scientific	objectivity	is	'irreducibly'	or	'inherently'	complex:	'None	of	these	meanings	is	logically	reducible	to	other	meanings	(unless	one	is	willing	to	make	rather	strong	metaphysical	or	epistemological	presumptions).	While	there	are	no	reducible	meanings	here,	neither	are	the	senses	unconnected.'	(Douglas	[2004],	p.	465.)	In	other	words,	when	the	ontological	aspect	of	objectivity	is	set	aside,	the	notion	seems	to	lose	its	unity.	If	one	does	not	want	to	claim	that	the	different	senses	of	objectivity	all	ultimately	follow	from	or	guarantee	faithfulness	to	facts,	one	is	left	with	an	irreducibly	complex	notion.	Nevertheless,	as	Douglas	([2004])	notes,	it	still	seems	to	be	one	notion,	not	several,	and	when	people	assess	the	objectivity	of	some	X,	they	often	implicitly	refer	to	several	different	senses	simultaneously.		
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In	her	own	answer	to	the	problem,	Douglas	follows	Arthur	Fine	([1998])	and	suggests	that	in	all	cases	objectivity	indicates	'a	shared	basis	for	trust	in	a	claim'	(Douglas	[2009],	p.	123):	'Common	to	all	the	uses	of	objectivity	is	this	sense	of	strong	trust	and	persuasive	endorsement,	this	claim	of	'I	trust	this,	and	you	should	too.'	It	is	this	commonality	that	underlies	the	usage	of	objectivity	in	its	various	guises.'	(Douglas	[2009],	p.	116.)	However,	I	believe	that	there	is	more	to	say	than	this:	by	combining	ideas	presented	in	philosophical	discussions	about	trust	and	reliance,	the	negative	senses	of	objectivity,	and	epistemic	risks,	it	is	possible	to	offer	a	more	precise	account	that	saves	the	unity	of	the	applicable	notion	of	scientific	objectivity.		
3.	Reliance	Instead	of	Trust	The	intuition	that	objectivity	is	somehow	linked	to	trust	is	shared	by	many,	and	understandably	so.	However,	I	would	like	to	argue	that	it	is	a	shared	basis	for	reliance,	not	trust,	that	we	should	talk	about	when	trying	to	identify	what	the	applicable	senses	of	objectivity	have	in	common:	when	we	who	use	any	of	those	senses	call	something	objective,	we	state	that	we	rely	on	it,	and	that	others	can	safely	do	so	too.	This	change	will	help	us	to	distinguish	between	situations	in	which	our	assessment	is	based	simply	on	trust,	and	situations	in	which	we	rely	on	more	than	mere	trust.	According	to	Fine,	objectivity	is	'that	which	in	the	process	of	inquiry	makes	for	trust	in	the	outcome	of	inquiry'	(Fine	[1998],	p.	127).	Naomi	Scheman	([2001])	also	links	objectivity	to	trust,	or	rather	trustworthiness:	according	to	her,	when	we	call	a	claim	objective,	we	present	it	as	scientifically	authoritative	and	say	that	others	too	should	accept	it.	As	most	people	are	unable	to	verify	scientific	claims	independently,	and	many	may	have	fully	rational	reasons	for	mistrusting	scientists,	they	must	be	given	the	opportunity	to	recognize	scientists	as	trustworthy.	Researchers	must	offer	them	a	real	chance	to	have	rationally	grounded	trust	in	science.	Both	Fine	and	Scheman	talk	explicitly	about	larger	audiences:	it	is	laypeople	who	should	be	able	to	trust	the	outcomes	of	science.	Moreover,	unlike	Fine	and	Douglas,	Scheman	makes	it	explicit	that	trust	is	needed	because	the	laypeople	who	should	be	able	to	accept	something	as	objective	cannot	always	independently	verify	that	it	is	indeed	worthy	of	being	accepted.	Their	acceptance	can	be	based	only	on	more	or	less	rationally	grounded	trust	in	the	researchers.	Douglas,	on	the	other	hand,	is	interested	in	the	different	senses	of	objectivity	identified	by	philosophers—so	when	she	talks	about	a	shared	basis	for	trust,	she	is	mainly	interested	in	the	viewpoint	of	the	person	making	the	assessment	that	something	is	objective,	and	in	expert	audiences	capable	of	assessing	the	claim.		Now	if	a	lay	community's	rationally	grounded	trust	in	X	increases,	from	the	point	of	view	of	an	expert	it	is	not	necessarily	the	case	that	the	objectivity	of	X	would	have	increased.	Let	us	imagine	a	research	process	that	has	been	designed	so	that	a	researcher	can	always	be	replaced	by	another,	and	that	will	not	change	the	result.	This	makes	the	process	objective	in	the	procedural	sense.	Researchers	using	the	process	then	initiate	a	systematic	campaign	of	science	communication	in	order	to	increase	transparency,	make	
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the	process	understandable,	and	thus	gain	the	rationally	grounded	trust	of	lay	audiences.	If	they	succeed	in	their	aim,	has	the	objectivity	of	the	process	increased?	Members	of	the	lay	audience	may	indeed	be	more	capable	of	making	an	informed	assessment	than	they	were	prior	to	the	campaign.	But	from	the	point	of	view	of	the	expert,	the	objectivity	of	the	process	does	not	seem	to	have	changed,	as	the	reasons	for	relying	on	it	have	not	changed.	We	can	distinguish	between	trust	and	reliance	by	saying	that	trust	can	be	betrayed	or	let	down,	whereas	reliance	cannot:	it	can	only	be	disappointed	(Baier	[1986];	McLeod	[2015]).1	This	makes	trust	into	something	that	we	have	towards	people,	and	perhaps	groups	or	communities,	but	not	processes	or	results.	We	can	rely	on	a	process,	but	as	a	process	cannot	betray	us,	we	cannot	trust	it.	Trust	is	needed	in	science,	as	researchers	cannot	always	verify	their	colleagues'	results,	but	have	to	simply	trust	them	(Hardwig	[1991];	see	also	Rolin	[forthcoming]).	So	trust	may	also	be	needed	when	we	accept	someone's	assessment	that	X	is	objective—or	when	our	assessment	that	X	is	objective	rests	on	our	confidence	that	a	researcher,	research	group	or	a	community	does	indeed	follow	some	specific	practices.	However,	in	some	other	cases	such	an	assessment	can	be	based,	for	instance,	on	our	thorough	understanding	of	the	workings	of	an	equipment:	we	believe	that	we	can	rely	on	it.	In	other	words,	our	reliance	on	X	can	be	based	on	trust,	but	especially	in	the	case	of	expert	assessments,	it	can	be	based	on	other	things	too.	So	objectivity	indicates	a	shared	basis	for	reliance,	rather	than	trust.	But	even	if	we	replace	trust	with	reliance,	we	do	not	yet	have	satisfactory	means	of	identifying	what	the	different	senses	of	objectivity	have	in	common.	As	Julian	Reiss	and	Jan	Sprenger	([2016])	note,	objectivity	cannot	be	identified	with	features	that	promote	trust	in	science,	as	trust	can	be	misguided.	The	same	applies	to	reliance:	this	kind	of	'instrumentalism'	about	scientific	objectivity	would	be	a	difficult	stance	to	sustain.	For	example,	as	Kristina	Rolin	([2002])	observes,	when	assessing	experts,	both	lay	audiences	and	researchers	can	err	in	questionable	ways,	for	instance	by	categorically	mistrusting	women	as	experts.	Similarly,	we	may	rely	on	a	knowledge	claim,	a	theory,	a	process,	etc.,	for	epistemically	dubious	reasons—think	of	craniology.	Of	course	no	one	has	suggested	that	felt	trust	be	used	as	an	indicator	of	objectivity.	However,	the	observation	by	Reiss	and	Sprenger	does	point	out	a	problem:	Janack	and	Douglas	have	identified	several	shared	bases	for	trust—or	rather	reliance—that	seem	to	justify	the	assessment	that	X	is	objective.	We	have	good	reasons	to	rely	on	X.	But	we	can	also	rely	on	something	without	having	good	reasons	for	doing	so.	Do	the	good	reasons	identified	by	Janack	and	Douglas	have	something	in	common?	I	believe	they	do.	This	becomes	clear	when	we	approach	objectivity	as	a	negative	term.		
																																																								1	I	use	the	notion	of	reliance	here	without	endorsing	any	reliabilist	theory	of	knowledge.	I	wish	to	present	an	account	of	scientific	objectivity	that	is	compatible	with	several	different	theories	of	knowledge.	
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4.	Epistemic	Risks	Arising	from	Our	Imperfections	as	Epistemic	Agents—Instead	
of	Subjectivity	Lorraine	Daston	and	Peter	Galison	([2007])	have	noted	that	when	new	senses	of	objectivity	have	emerged	in	science,	they	have	been	related	to	newly	recognized	forms	of	'scientific	subjectivity'	and	epistemic	worries	arising	from	these.	For	instance,	at	the	end	of	the	19th	century	the	development	of	photography	and	microscopes	revealed	that	researchers	had	been	inadvertently	idealising	the	objects	they	were	supposed	to	observe—a	drop	of	water	was	not	as	perfectly	symmetrical	as	they	had	supposed.	Daston	and	Galison	conclude	that	the	normativity	of	the	notion	of	scientific	objectivity	has	historically	been	based	on	the	duty	of	scientists	to	avoid	some	form	or	forms	of	subjectivity.2			However,	it	may	be	misleading	to	talk	about	subjectivity	here.	Historically,	such	newly	recognized	worries	have	indeed	often	been	closely	linked	to	errors	made	by	individual	researchers,	and	thus	to	subjectivity.	More	recently,	however,	it	has	become	clear	that	the	lack	of	objectivity	does	not	necessarily	originate	from	us	as	individual	subjects.	Collective	biases	(e.g.	Longino	[1990],	[2001])	and	cognitive	biases	typical	to	us	as	human	beings	have	also	been	getting	attention	recently.	Moreover,	as	many	accept	that	non-epistemic	values	have	legitimate	roles	in	science,	banishing	subjectivity	entirely	seems	problematic	as	an	aim,	as	those	values	are	necessarily	somewhat	subjective	(Douglas	[2004]).	So	philosophers	of	science	now	often	use	'biased'	rather	than	'subjective'	as	the	opposite	of	'objective'	(e.g.	Jukola	[2015]).	Ian	Hacking	([2015])	talks	simply	of	epistemic	vices.	Following	Daston's	and	Galison's	lead,	he	holds	'objective'	to	be	an	entirely	negative	adjective:	it	marks	the	absence	of	this	or	that	vice.	I	too	agree	that	the	unity	of	the	applicable	notion	of	objectivity	is	found	in	the	negative	side	of	the	notion.	However,	I	would	like	to	talk	about	epistemic	risks	rather	than	vices,	and	to	point	out	that	not	all	epistemic	risks	count.	Let	us	return	to	the	different	applicable	senses	of	objectivity	Janack	and	Douglas	have	described.	In	each	case	they	mention	or	clearly	imply	a	threat	or	several	threats	that	are	being	averted;	a	contrast	or	contrasts	to	objectivity.	These	contrasts	include	illusions,	subjectivity,	idiosyncrasies,	and	collective	biases.	I	think	it	is	unnecessarily	harsh	to	call	something	like	being	fooled	by	an	illusion	a	vice.	We	human	beings	are	in	many	ways	imperfect	as	epistemic	agents.	For	instance,	we	are	prone	to	be	fooled	by	certain	types	of	illusion.	I	prefer	to	say	that	the	different	contrasts	to	objectivity	are	all	what	Justin	B.	Biddle	and	Rebecca	Kukla	call	epistemic	risks.		An	epistemic	risk,	in	the	broad	sense	of	the	term	Biddle	and	Kukla	endorse,	is	'any	risk	of	epistemic	error	that	arises	anywhere	during	knowledge	practices'	(Biddle	and	Kukla	[2017],	p.	218).	They	start	their	treatment	of	this	notion	from	the	discussion	of	inductive	risks	that	was	mentioned	earlier,	and	note	that	though	inductive	risk	is	an																																																									2	This	negative	approach	answers	Fine's	([1998])	claim	that	inferring	the	objectivity	of	a	result	from	the	objectivity	of	a	research	process	would	be	an	example	of	the	process–product	fallacy.	If	the	process	is	designed	so	as	to	avoid	some	specific	form	of	'scientific	subjectivity',	it	is	not	a	fallacy	to	conclude	that	the	product	is	not	distorted	by	that	form	of	subjectivity.	
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important	epistemic	risk,	it	is	far	from	the	only	one	researchers	have	to	cope	with.	They	distinguish	several	different	types	of	epistemic	risks,	starting	from	the	risk	of	having	mistaken	beliefs,	or	'alethic	risk',	and	the	risk	of	simple	reasoning	error,	or	'analytic	risk',	and	ending	with	complex	'phronetic'	risks	that	must	bee	managed	in	light	of	values	and	interests—for	instance,	risks	related	to	operationalisation,	concept	formation,	or	model	choice.	Scientists	face	phronetic	risks	when	doing	things	that	are	preconditions	for	empirical	reasoning,	or	a	necessary	part	of	it.	Inductive	risk	is	one	of	these,	but	as	Biddle	and	Kukla	argue,	not	the	only	one.	It	is	not	possible	for	scientists	to	proceed	in	their	work	without	continually	facing	and	mitigating	diverse	epistemic	risks.	As	there	is	a	large	variety	of	such	risks—Biddle	and	Kukla's	typology	is	not	meant	to	be	exhaustive—the	strategies	for	managing	them	also	vary.	(Biddle	and	Kukla	[2017];	Biddle	[forthcoming].)	The	risks	that	interest	us	here	belong	to	a	specific	subset	of	epistemic	risks.	We	start	talking	about	objectivity	only	when	facing	certain	kinds	of	risks.	For	instance,	when	the	results	of	an	experiment	are	incorrect	because	of	malfunctioning	equipment,	we	do	not	worry	about	objectivity—we	just	say	that	the	results	should	not	be	taken	into	account.	So	epistemic	risks	arising	from	the	imperfections	of	a	machine	usually	do	not	induce	us	to	talk	about	objectivity.	Neither	do	occasional	errors	of	reasoning:	only	recurrent	errors	can	count	as	threats	to	objectivity,	particularly	ones	arising	from	cognitive	biases	typical	to	us	as	human	beings.	So	only	some,	but	not	all	analytic	risks	count.	Alethic	risks	can	count	if	it	is	due	to	our	own	failings	that	we	hold	mistaken	beliefs.	Likewise,	of	the	epistemic	risks	related	to	observation,	only	those	count	that	arise	from	our	deficiencies	as	observers.	And	many,	perhaps	even	most	phronetic	risks	seem	to	be	similarly	related	to	potential	worries	about	objectivity.	For	instance,	one	of	the	most	important	epistemic	risks	related	to	concept	formation	is	that	the	concepts	may,	unbeknown	to	us,	end	up	reflecting	some	bias	of	ours.		So	it	is	only	when	the	epistemic	risk	is	related	to	our	own	failings,	and	is	hard	to	avert,	that	we	start	talking	about	objectivity.	Illusions,	subjectivity,	idiosyncrasies,	and	collective	biases	are	important	epistemic	risks	arising	from	our	imperfections	as	epistemic	agents.	By	talking	about	these	epistemic	risks	we	can	give	a	more	precise	account	of	the	basic	idea	of	Daston	and	Galison,	while	avoiding	the	problems	related	to	the	notion	of	subjectivity.		
5.	The	Risk	Account	of	Scientific	Objectivity	So	I	would	like	to	suggest	the	following:	When	we	who	use	any	of	the	applicable	senses	of	objectivity	call	X	objective,	we	endorse	it:	we	say	that	we	rely	on	X,	and	that	others	should	do	so	too.	But	the	word	'objective'	is	reserved	for	a	specific	type	of	reliance:	it	is	based	on	the	belief	that	important	epistemic	risks	arising	from	our	imperfections	as	epistemic	agents	have	been	effectively	averted.	For	example,	when	we	say	that	a	research	community	is	objective	in	the	interactive	sense,	we	state	that	we	rely	on	the	community,	and	that	others	have	good	reason	to	rely	
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on	it	too,	as	it	follows	practices	that	ensure	effective	critical	discussions	and	debates—which	we	take	to	be	an	efficient	strategy	for	averting	many	individual	and	collective	biases.	Or	when	say	that	we	do	not	doubt	the	objectivity	of	a	result	because	we	can	reach	it	using	different	research	approaches	independent	of	each	other,	what	we	are	in	fact	claiming	is	that	this	is	an	efficient	strategy	for	ensuring	that	the	result	is	not	just	a	fantasy,	or	an	illusion	created	by	our	theoretical	assumptions.	And	when	we	call	a	method	objective	in	the	procedural	sense,	we	state	that	it	has	been	designed	in	a	way	that	screens	out	the	possibility	of	individual	biases	or	idiosyncrasies	distorting	the	results.	The	different	senses	of	objectivity	have	normative	force	in	so	far	as	they	offer	good	reasons	for	relying	on	the	X	that	is	called	objective.	All	the	different	applicable	positive	senses	of	objectivity	do	this	by	making	an	essentially	negative	claim.	They	identify	epistemic	risks	arising	from	our	imperfections	as	epistemic	agents,	and/or	effective	strategies	for	averting	them.	The	risk	account	chimes	in	with	the	ways	in	which	we	use	the	adjective	'objective'.	As	noted,	malfunctioning	equipment	does	not	induce	us	to	talk	about	objectivity.	But	if	we	refuse	to	take	the	malfunction	into	account	even	after	becoming	aware	of	it,	and	continue	using	the	results,	questions	about	objectivity	may	arise.	Or	if	we	design	software	that	repeats	some	widespread	bias	(e.g.	facial-recognition	software	might	have	racial	bias	problems	because	of	the	sets	of	images	used	in	the	training	of	the	algorithms),	we	may	talk	about	objectivity—precisely	because	it	is	our	bias	that	the	software	is	repeating.	Or	if	archaeological	data	from	an	area	is	first	interpreted	in	a	certain	way,	and	then	newly	discovered	data	make	it	clear	that	the	interpretation	cannot	be	correct,	we	do	not	talk	about	objectivity;	we	just	say	that	the	former	interpretation	was	wrong.	But	if	archaeologists	do	not	pay	attention	to	the	new	data	and	continue	to	endorse	the	old	interpretation,	then	questions	about	objectivity	do	arise.	So	objectivity	is	related	to	our	failings	as	epistemic	agents.3	We	can	now	spell	out	several	issues	related	to	the	applicable	notion	of	objectivity.	The	account	helps	us	to	understand	why	the	different,	applicable	senses	of	objectivity	are	often	related	to	some	specific	context,	and	why	objectivity	does	not	imply	certainty.	It	also	allows	comparisons,	making	objectivity	a	degree	concept.	Moreover,	it	helps	us	to	analyse	what	happens	when	people	disagree	about	the	objectivity	of	something,	and	
																																																								3	I	have	just	claimed	that	when	a	machine	malfunctions,	we	do	not	talk	about	objectivity.	However,	the	current	rapid	progress	in	the	development	of	AI,	and	particularly	machine	learning,	may	change	the	situation.	As	AI	systems	are	used	increasingly	in	science,	and	as	the	ways	in	which	AI	works	are	not	transparent	to	humans,	an	AI	system	may	gain	the	role	of	an	epistemic	agent	in	scientific	research.	Algorithmic	AI	systems,	or	any	other	AI	systems,	do	not	constitute	perfect	epistemic	agents:	it	is	not	always	possible	to	detect	why	a	particular	trained	model	is	effective	in	completing	its	task,	and	such	a	model	may	also	fail	in	unpredictable	ways	(see	e.g.	NSTC	[2016]).	This	may	bring	about	new,	unforeseen	ways	of	being	imperfect	as	an	epistemic	agent—and,	as	a	result,	new	epistemic	risks.	It	remains	to	be	seen	whether	the	notion	of	objectivity	will	be	applied	to	such	cases,	or	whether	we	continue	focusing	on	individual	and	collective	human	agents.	This	does	not	in	any	substantial	sense	threaten	the	risk	account,	but	it	may	either	bring	about	new	senses	of	objectivity,	or	require	a	small	alteration	in	the	account.	Either	we	accept	AI	systems	as	agents	that	may	be	sources	of	bias,	and	begin	assessing	their	objectivity,	or	the	account	should	be	changed	so	that	it	only	covers	the	imperfections	of	human	agents.	
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even	makes	it	clear	why	such	disagreements	can	be	rational.	And	finally,	it	brings	unity	to	the	notion.	The	risk	account	clarifies	why	objectivity	is	a	contextual	matter.	First,	we	are	imperfect	as	epistemic	agents	in	many	ways:	we	are	prone	to	wishful	thinking;	we	can	be	fooled	by	illusions;	as	communities	we	may	share	ideas	and	values	without	even	realising	we	do	so;	et	cetera.	Our	imperfections	lead	to	many	different	kinds	of	epistemic	risks.	It	is	plausible	that	some	of	them	are	particularly	pressing	in	some	contexts,	other	ones	in	others.	So	what	the	important	risks	are	depends	on	the	context.	Secondly,	the	account	separates	strategies	developed	for	averting	some	risk	from	the	risk	itself.	There	is	no	need	to	think	that	a	single	risk	could	not	be	averted	in	several	different	ways.	Some	are	more	appropriate	in	some	contexts,	others	in	others.		The	risk	account	also	makes	it	clear	why	calling	X,	for	example	a	method,	objective	does	not	imply	that	the	results	of	research	would	be	certain.	Something	unrelated	to	objectivity	(e.g.	malfunctioning	equipment)	may	skew	the	results.	Or	the	strategy	used	for	averting	some	risk	may	fail,	or	it	may	not	be	as	efficient	as	we	believe	it	to	be.	Or	there	may	be	risks	we	have	not	identified.	Or	we	may	later	conclude	that	the	risk	was	not	as	important	as	we	thought,	so	averting	it	did	not	significantly	increase	the	overall	objectivity	of	X.	Daston	and	Galison	([2007])	describe	how	newly	recognized	epistemic	risks	have	led	to	new	conceptions	of	objectivity—but	also	how	older	senses	of	objectivity	have	dissolved	or	lost	their	salience	as	new	regimes	have	gained	importance.		The	risk	account	allows	for	comparisons:	it	is	possible	to	say	that	X	is	more	or	less	objective	than	Y	without	claiming	that	either	is	perfectly	objective.	We	may	deem	the	strategies	used	for	averting	epistemic	risks	more	or	less	reliable,	and	one	may	be	able	to	avert	one	recognized	epistemic	risk	or	several.	So	objectivity	is	a	degree	concept.	However,	comparing	the	objectivity	of	X	and	Y	in	two	different	contexts	is	at	the	very	least	difficult.	To	do	so	one	would	have	to	recognize	two	sets	of	important	risks	arising	from	our	imperfections	as	epistemic	agents:	one	set	for	X	in	one	context,	and	another	for	
Y	in	another.	Then	one	should	assess	how	well	the	risks	are	averted	in	each	case,	and	finally	compare	these	assessments.	If	both	the	sets	of	important	risks	and	the	strategies	used	to	avert	them	are	very	different,	the	comparison	can	easily	become	meaningless.	However,	sometimes	even	such	comparisons	are	possible—for	example,	when	comparing	a	young	research	programme	with	a	well-established	one.	The	latter	will	most	likely	have	approved	strategies	for	averting	the	epistemic	risks	deemed	important	in	its	context,	whereas	the	former	will	not	yet	have	had	the	time	to	develop	its	strategies.	As	noted,	when	assessing	the	objectivity	of	some	X,	people	quite	often	disagree.	We	can	now	identify	some	components	of	such	disagreements,	and	recognize	how	value	judgements	influence	them.		What	we	take	to	be	an	important	risk	depends	on	different	things	in	different	contexts.	The	threshold	after	which	we	are	satisfied	that	the	risk	has	been	averted	effectively	
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enough	depends	on	the	context	too.	Both	epistemic	and	non-epistemic	values	influence	such	assessments,	which	can	lead	to	disagreements.	First,	as	Thomas	Kuhn	([1977])	argued,	individuals	may	legitimately	differ	about	the	application	of	different	epistemic	values	to	concrete	cases.	For	instance,	two	scientists	can	disagree	whether	to	value	the	accuracy	of	a	theory	over	its	scope	in	some	case,	or	its	consistency	over	fruitfulness.	Such	disagreements	can	lead	to	differing	assessments	of	the	most	important	epistemic	risks	to	be	averted	in	that	case:	one	of	the	scientists	would	focus	particularly	on	such	risks	arising	from	our	imperfections	as	epistemic	agents	that	threaten	the	accuracy	and	consistency	of	the	theory;	the	other	would	be	more	worried	about	risks	that	somehow	threaten	its	scope	and	fruitfulness.	Now	there	may	be	unavoidable	trade-offs	between	two	incompatible	strategies,	each	of	which	would	be	particularly	good	for	averting	some	specific	risk.	So	one	has	to	decide	which	risks	to	prioritize.	In	other	words,	if	scientists	can	rationally	disagree	about	the	application	of	epistemic	values	in	some	context,	they	can	also	rationally	disagree	about	the	objectivity	of	some	X	in	some	context.	Secondly,	as	has	been	made	clear	in	the	discussion	of	inductive	risk	and	epistemic	risks,	the	aims	of	a	research	project	or	programme,	or	the	anticipated	context	of	use	of	the	results,	must	often	influence	our	assessments	of	the	importance	of	some	risk,	and	of	the	threshold	after	which	we	are	satisfied	that	the	risk	has	been	averted	effectively	enough.	In	some	contexts,	non-epistemic	values	must	play	an	important	role	in	such	assessments.	(Rudner	[1953];	Douglas	[2000];	[2009];	Biddle	and	Kukla	[2017];	Biddle	[forthcoming].)	In	policy-relevant	research,	for	instance,	non-epistemic	values	must	often	be	taken	into	account	when	determining	epistemic	risks	that	have	to	be	avoided	particularly	carefully—and	different	sets	of	values	will	lead	to	differing	assessments.	In	other	contexts,	such	as	some	forms	of	basic	research	without	any	foreseeable	applications,	both	the	important	risks	and	the	threshold	after	which	we	are	satisfied	may	be	determined	on	more	purely	epistemic	grounds.	So	a	dispute	about	the	objectivity	of	some	X	in	some	context	can	be	based	on	differing	assessments	of	what	the	important	risks	are	that	must	be	averted	in	that	context,	or	of	the	efficiency	of	the	strategies	used,	or	of	the	threshold	after	which	we	should	deem	a	strategy	effective	enough.	For	example,	an	archaeologist	could	consider	the	results	of	a	research	project	objective	because	the	methods	used	are	objective	in	the	procedural	sense:	the	results	stay	the	same	even	if	different	researchers	repeat	the	process.	However,	other	archaeologists	could	disagree	because	they	believe	that	ethnocentric	bias	embedded	in	the	background	assumptions	of	the	methods	can	make	researchers	blind	to	the	existence	of	some	important	evidence	or	interpretive	resources.	So	before	this	threat	is	averted,	one	should	not	rely	on	the	results	of	the	project,	nor	an	overall	picture	of	the	research	subject	drawn	from	them	(see	Wylie	[2015]).	In	such	a	case	the	disagreement	stems	from	different	assessments	of	what	are	the	important	risks	in	the	context	of	that	archaeological	project.	The	strategy	the	first	archaeologist	finds	satisfying	will	avert	individual	biases	and	idiosyncrasies.	But	it	is	not	efficient	against	collective	bias.	
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So	the	risk	account	clarifies	several	issues	related	to	the	applicable	senses	of	objectivity.	It	also	brings	unity	to	the	notion.	As	Douglas	([2004],	[2009])	points	out,	none	of	the	recognized	positive	senses	of	objectivity	is	reducible	to	the	others.	This	becomes	quite	understandable	when	we	realize	that	each	sense	identifies	either	some	specific	risk,	or	an	efficient	strategy	for	averting	some	important	epistemic	risk	or	several	risks	arising	from	our	imperfections	as	epistemic	agents.	Many	different	epistemic	risks	arise	from	our	imperfections	as	epistemic	agents;	for	instance,	our	work	can	be	too	subjective,	or	we	can	succumb	to	collective	bias.	In	fact,	every	new	insight	about	the	ways	in	which	we	are	imperfect	as	epistemic	agents	can	bring	forth	new	senses	of	objectivity.	Moreover,	even	a	single	risk	can	be	averted	in	several	different	ways.	For	example,	we	can	try	to	ensure	that	an	object	posited	by	a	theory	is	not	just	an	illusion	by	using	several	independent	methods	of	observation,	as	in	convergent	objectivity,	or	by	using	the	object	as	a	tool,	as	in	manipulable	objectivity	(Douglas	[2004]).	As	our	failings	as	epistemic	agents	give	rise	to	several	epistemic	risks	that	can	be	deemed	important	in	some	context,	the	number	of	distinct	senses	of	objectivity	is	bound	to	be	large.		
6.	Is	This	Useful?	My	aim	has	been	to	produce	an	account	that	covers	the	diverse,	applicable	senses	of	scientific	objectivity	recognized	in	the	recent	literature.	The	result	is	an	account	that	links	objectivity	strongly	to	reliance,	imperfect	epistemic	agents,	and	epistemic	risks.	This	raises	two	interrelated	questions.	First,	is	this	kind	of	notion	of	objectivity	a	necessary	one	at	all—or	are	the	different	senses	of	objectivity	discussed	here	ultimately	redundant?	Secondly,	even	if	the	different	senses	of	objectivity	are	worth	defending,	does	this	account	add	anything	to	their	applicability	and	usefulness?	After	all,	what	is	wanted	in	the	literature	I	am	discussing	is	an	applicable	notion	with	normative	force.	The	account	clarifies	why	the	different	senses	of	objectivity	have	normative	force,	but	is	it	itself	useful	in	any	of	the	diverse	contexts	where	we	would	actually	want	to	assess	the	objectivity	of	something?		Several	philosophers	have	suggested	that	we	could	simply	drop	the	notion	of	objectivity,	because	it	is	too	muddled	to	be	of	any	use.	For	instance,	Hacking	([2015])	warns	us	against	using	the	noun	'objectivity',	as	he	takes	it	to	be	an	unnecessary	elevator	word.	As	philosophers	of	science,	we	should	concentrate	on	being	of	some	use	in	discussions	that	aim	to	assess	whether	some	X	in	some	specific	context	is	objective	or	not,	and	for	that	purpose	we	only	need	the	adjective,	not	the	noun	that	only	philosophers	tend	to	use.		This	may	be	quite	right	if	one	uses	a	notion	of	objectivity	that	combines	the	epistemic	aspect	of	objectivity	with	the	ontological	one.	However,	I	do	not	think	Hacking's	criticism	applies	to	the	applicable	senses	of	objectivity	recognized	in	the	recent	literature	and	discussed	here.	Their	meanings	are	restricted	enough	for	them	to	be	genuinely	useful	in	the	epistemic	assessment	of	X	in	diverse	contexts.	Moreover,	
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philosophers	should	be	allowed	to	have	etic	notions,	and	objectivity	can	be	a	valuable	one.	Or	can	it?	The	senses	of	objectivity	the	risk	account	covers	offer	reasons	for	relying	on	research	processes,	communities,	methods,	etc.,	and	as	Douglas	([2004],	[2009])	notes,	ultimately	on	the	produced	knowledge	claims.	So,	to	quote	Sandra	Harding,	do	they	add	anything	'to	assessments	of	the	truth,	'verisimilitude,'	reliability	or	productive	power	of	research	results'?	(Harding	[2015],	p.	xii.)	If	we	accept	the	risk	account,	objectivity	is	a	weaker	notion	than	truth	or	verisimilitude:	when	we	call	a	claim	objective,	we	do	not	necessarily	contend	that	it	is	true,	or	even	claim	that	it	appears	to	be	true	or	real.	We	only	claim	that	we	have	very	good	reasons	to	rely	on	it.4	Calling	X	objective	also	differs	from	claiming	that	it	has	productive	power—an	objective	knowledge	claim	can	easily	be	unimportant,	or	an	objective	process	redundant.	Even	if	we	take	X	to	be	objective,	we	may	conclude	that	we	have	no	need	for	it,	or	do	not	wish	to	use	it.	So	it	remains	to	show	that	even	if	objectivity	is	closely	related	to	reliance,	it	is	a	useful	notion	in	its	own	right.	This	I	find	unproblematic:	it	is	good	to	have	an	evaluative	notion	that	focuses	on	the	epistemic	risks	arising	from	our	imperfections	as	epistemic	agents.5	But	even	if	the	different	senses	of	objectivity	are	useful,	does	the	same	apply	to	the	risk	account	itself?	Can	it	be	used	for	anything	besides	describing	what	the	different	senses	have	in	common?	In	order	to	illustrate	that	it	can,	I	will	now	briefly	describe	two	contexts	where	I	believe	the	account	can	be	applied	in	fruitful	ways.	I	will	first	address	the	old	and	well-known	question	of	objectivity	in	humanities	research.	Then	I	will	turn	to	the	new	question	of	objectivity	in	the	context	of	the	democratisation	of	scientific	knowledge	production.	Doubts	about	the	possibility	of	objectivity	in	the	humanities	and	in	the	social	sciences	using	qualitative	methods	have	usually	arisen	from	comparisons	to	the	natural	sciences.	The	risk	account	allows	us	to	distinguish	between	two	ways	in	which	such	comparisons	can	be	misleading.		First,	one	may	identify	objectivity	with	specific	strategies	for	averting	epistemic	risks,	ones	that	have	been	developed	in	the	natural	sciences—such	as	controlled	experiments.	This	would	obviously	be	a	mistake.	Although	those	strategies	are	not	usually	available,	for	instance,	in	historiography,	because	of	the	nature	of	the	research	subject,	it	may	be	possible	to	avert	the	same	risks	using	other	strategies.																																																									4	Similarly,	calling	something	objective	is	a	stronger	statement	than	calling	it	justified.	Some	craniologists	might	have	been	justified	in	believing	what	they	did,	but	when	assessing	the	objectivity	of	their	work,	we	assess	it	from	our	perspective,	and	find	it	unsatisfactory.	5	I	should	note	that	there	is	no	conflict	between	Harding's	([1986])	own	take	on	objectivity	and	the	risk	account.	The	'strong	objectivity'	sense	of	objectivity	identifies	epistemic	risks	arising	from	our	imperfections	as	epistemic	agents:	if	knowledge	production	is	exclusively	in	the	hands	of	socially	dominant	groups,	researchers	are	easily	blinded	to	relations	of	power	and	the	ways	in	which	these	relations	can	distort	the	knowledge	produced.	Such	risks	are	particularly	important	in	contexts	where	the	prospective	use	of	the	research	results	will	affect	the	lives	of	socially	marginal	groups.	In	order	to	avert	the	risks,	their	viewpoints	should	be	taken	into	account	in	the	knowledge	production.		
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A	second,	more	important	error	is	that	of	focusing	solely	on	those	epistemic	risks	that	have	been	found	important	in	the	natural	sciences	and	thus	received	attention	there.	As	Daston	and	Galison	([2007])	describe,	the	history	of	the	most	influential	senses	of	objectivity	in	the	natural	sciences	is	based	on	a	set	of	different	conceptions	of	subjectivity.	All	of	these	conceptions	focus	on	individual	subjects.	And	the	same	is	often	the	case	in	discussions	about	the	possibility	or	impossibility	of	objectivity	in	the	humanities	and	some	of	the	social	sciences.	There	are	longstanding	disagreements	on	whether	the	interpretative	methods,	unavoidably	value-laden	categories	and	notions,	and	narrative	modes	of	expression	used	in	fields	like	historiography,	sociology,	and	all	the	disciplines	using	ethnographic	methods	make	these	disciplines	hopelessly	subjective	and	doomed	to	being	politically	biased	(see	e.g.	Novick	[1988];	White	[2000];	Montuschi	[2014];	Axtell	[2016]).	However,	if	we	understand	these	epistemic	risks,	subjectivity	and	value-ladenness,	as	arising	from	our	imperfections	as	individual	epistemic	agents	alone,	this	may	prevent	us	from	paying	due	attention	to	other	important	risks	and	to	strategies	developed	for	averting	them.	As	noted,	the	relevance	of	different	risks	arising	from	our	imperfections	as	epistemic	agents	may	vary	in	different	contexts.	For	instance,	collective	biases	are	often	taken	very	seriously	in	humanities	research	and	in	the	social	sciences.	This	might	be	because	they	pose	a	particularly	important	epistemic	risk	in	many	of	the	fields	in	question,	or	perhaps	the	risk	is	just	easier	to	recognize	in	these	contexts.	In	any	case,	it	should	be	noted	that	historians	have	been	very	aware	of	the	risk	of	Whig	historiography	for	a	long	time,	and	ethnographers	of	the	risk	of	ethnocentrism—both	being	types	of	collective	bias.	It	is	not	only	individual	political	bias	but	collective	political	bias	that	is	treated	as	an	important	risk	in	historiography,	sociology,	and	ethnographic	research,	because	when	such	a	bias	is	shared	by	the	whole	research	community,	it	can	go	undetected	(Daston	[2014];	Axtell	[2016]).	Controlled	experiments	are	not	a	particularly	effective	strategy	against	collective	bias.	In	fact,	any	procedure	that	is	meant	to	screen	out	just	the	subjective	biases	and	idiosyncrasies	of	individual	researchers	is	fairly	inefficient	against	collective	bias	(Longino	[1990];	[2001]).	It	matters	little	that	you	may	change	researchers,	repeat	an	experiment,	and	still	get	the	same	result,	if	your	theoretical	background	assumptions,	and	as	a	result	the	whole	setting	of	the	experiment,	are	biased.	For	example,	procedural	objectivity	did	not	prevent	the	study	of	primates	in	the	1950's	from	being	sexist	(Haraway	[1989]).	Research	was	based	on	male-dominance	schemas,	which	distorted	the	results,	and	even	more	importantly,	the	overall	picture	of	primates	drawn	from	them.	Now	let	us	compare	the	primatology	of	those	days	with	the	humanities	and	social	sciences	of	the	same	era.	Some	of	the	latter	fields	had,	if	not	perfect,	at	least	advanced	strategies	for	averting	collective	biases. For	example,	in	ethnographic	research6	it	was																																																									6	Cultural	anthropology	is	sometimes	classified	as	a	social	science,	and	sometimes	as	a	humanities	discipline.	Some	other	fields	that	use	ethnographic	methods,	such	as	ethnology	and	folkloristics,	are	typically	taken	to	belong	to	the	humanities.		
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already	by	that	time	customary	to	avoid	the	epistemic	appraisal	of	the	knowledge	systems	of	the	cultures	being	studied,	and	the	beliefs	of	the	informants.	This	was	done	in	order	to	avoid	ethnocentrism.	Epistemic	appraisal	of	a	knowledge	claim	is	always	based	on	an	interpretation	of	that	claim.	However,	the	interpretation	of	claims	such	as	'My	brother	is	a	parrot'	can	be	a	complex	task,	requiring	thorough	understanding	of	the	knowledge	system	and	conceptual	framework	where	the	claim	is	uttered,	with	which	the	researcher	is	originally	not	familiar	(see	Risjord	[1993]).	If	an	ethnographer	would	start	evaluating	such	knowledge	claims	right	away,	the	assessment	would	most	likely	be	based	on	an	ethnocentric	interpretation,	and	would	thus	be	misleading.	That	is	why	such	assessments	were	methodologically	avoided	(Asad	[1986];	Koskinen	[2015]).	So	while	the	primatologists	did	not	even	notice	that	sexism	skewed	their	results,	ethnographers	had	quite	sophisticated	strategies	for	averting	ethnocentrism.	If	we	talk	about	objectivity	in	humanities	research	and	in	the	qualitative	social	sciences,	but	focus	only	on	individual	biases,	such	strategies	developed	for	averting	collective	bias	easily	go	unnoticed.	However,	they	should	be	taken	into	account	when	assessing	the	overall	objectivity	of	research	done	in	these	fields.—And	the	risk	account	is	useful	when	clarifying	why	this	is	the	case.	Let	us	now	turn	to	the	second	short	example:	objectivity	in	the	context	of	the	new	forms	of	research	where	researchers	try	to	democratize	scientific	knowledge	production,	such	as	citizen	science	and	participatory	research.	The	risk	account	can	be	used	for	distinguishing	between	two	basic	ways	in	which	such	a	change	in	the	context	of	research	may	threaten	its	objectivity.		First,	as	the	context	changes,	some	new	epistemic	risk	arising	from	our	imperfections	as	epistemic	agents	may	become	important.	For	example,	researchers	in	many	fields	have	expressed	the	worry	that	people	participating	in	citizen	science	projects	may	have	political	goals	or	other	partisan	interests	related	to	the	research	subject,	and	this	may	end	up	making	the	results	biased	(see	e.g.	Rise	of	the	citizen	scientist	[2015]).	This	may	happen	even	in	contexts	where	the	risk	of	such	biases	has	not	been	important	previously.	So	the	change	in	the	context	may	necessitate	the	implementation	of	strategies	for	averting	a	risk	that	has	become	newly	important.	Secondly,	which	might	be	less	obvious	and	thus	more	interesting,	when	the	context	changes,	established	strategies	for	averting	epistemic	risks	can	cease	to	function	satisfactorily.	As	noted,	a	strategy	efficient	in	one	context	may	not	work	or	may	even	be	impossible	to	implement	in	another	context.	For	instance,	the	practice	of	avoiding	the	epistemic	appraisal	of	the	informants'	beliefs	has	been	an	effective	way	to	avoid	ethnocentrism	in	ethnographic	research.	However,	when	former	informants	become	co-researchers	in	participatory	projects,	the	practice	becomes	untenable.	It	is	neither	respectful	nor	epistemically	acceptable	to	avoid	the	epistemic	appraisal	of	the	knowledge	claims	of	some	members	of	a	research	team	(Koskinen	[2014]).	A	new	strategy	for	avoiding	ethnocentrism	must	be	devised.	
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The	risk	account	of	scientific	objectivity	mostly	just	describes	what	the	different	applicable	senses	of	objectivity	have	in	common.	But	I	hope	these	two	examples	demonstrate	that	the	account	can	also	prove	useful	in	some	of	the	contexts	where	we	wish	to	actually	assess	the	objectivity	of	something.		
7.	Conclusion	My	aim	has	been	to	bring	some	unity	to	the	discussion	of	objectivity:	to	cover,	with	a	single	account,	all	the	applicable	senses	of	scientific	objectivity	recognized	in	the	recent	literature,	and	to	clarify	why	they	have	normative	force.	This	I	have	done	by	combining	ideas	presented	in	philosophical	discussions,	and	by	adding	one	observation.		I	started	from	the	intuition	that	the	diverse	positive	senses	of	objectivity	are	all	related	to	trust	(Fine	[1998];	Scheman	[2001];	Douglas	[2004]).	However,	if	we	take	into	account	the	literature	on	trust	both	in	epistemology	and	in	philosophy	of	science	(McLeod	[2015];	Hardwig	[1991];	Rolin	[forthcoming]),	it	becomes	clear	that	trust	is	not	quite	what	we	should	concentrate	on.	I	suggested	that	the	intuition	be	refined.	First,	instead	of	trust,	we	should	talk	about	reliance.	When	we	call	X	objective,	we	say	that	we	rely	on	it,	and	that	others	should	do	so	too.	Secondly,	instrumentalism	about	objectivity	will	not	do:	objectivity	cannot	be	identified	with	just	any	features	that	promote	trust	or	reliance,	as	both	can	be	misguided	(Reiss	and	Sprenger	[2016]).	In	order	to	understand	when	the	reliance	is	well	grounded—that	is,	what	gives	the	different	senses	of	objectivity	their	normative	force—I	turned	to	the	negative	accounts	of	objectivity,	in	which	objectivity	marks	the	absence	of	something	(Daston	and	Galison	[2007];	Hacking	[2015]).	I	then	defined	this	'something'	as	epistemic	risks	(Biddle	and	Kukla	[2017];	Biddle	[forthcoming])	arising	from	our	imperfections	as	epistemic	agents.	When	we	call	
X	objective,	we	believe	that	important	epistemic	risks	arising	from	our	imperfections	as	epistemic	agents	have	been	effectively	averted.		The	risk	account	of	scientific	objectivity	I	have	defended	here	identifies	imperfect	epistemic	agents,	context-dependent	epistemic	risks,	and	strategies	developed	for	averting	them	as	integral	elements	of	objectivity.	Every	positive,	applicable	sense	of	objectivity	recognized	in	the	recent	literature	makes	an	essentially	negative	claim.	They	all	identify	either	an	epistemic	risk,	or	some	efficient	strategy	for	averting	one	or	more	important	epistemic	risks	that	arise	from	our	imperfections	as	epistemic	agents.		This	article	has	been	a	mostly	descriptive	exercise.	But	I	also	hope	to	have	made	it	clear	why	I	hold	the	applicable	notion	of	scientific	objectivity	to	be	worth	defending,	and	to	have	demonstrated	that	the	risk	account	can	be	useful	in	the	analysis	of	questions	about	objectivity	in	different	contexts.					
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